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Abstract: 
Metacognition loosely refers to one’s “thinking about thinking” and is often defined by 
its accompanying skills (such as monitoring and evaluating). Despite the tendency for 
researchers to use metacognition as an overarching umbrella term, cognitive and 
educational theorists argue as to whether metacognition is a single construct or made up 
of distinct, differentiable factors. Given the lack of clarity in the definition of 
metacognition and its potential components, the purpose of this investigation is to 
determine whether a two-factor model, representing knowledge and regulation of 
metacognition, or five-factor model, representing metacognitive knowledge, planning, 
monitoring, regulation/control, and evaluation, emerges following both exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses. Participants (N =644) from a select number of classes at a 
large Midwestern university we selected to complete the Metacognition Questionnaire, 
a 30 item survey designed to measure five components of metacognition that are rarely 
measured concurrently. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed a two-factor 
model resembling metacognitive knowledge and regulation. This two-factor model had 
Further confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) showed that the two-factor model 
outperformed the five-factor model based on the fit indices. This study confirms that the 
componential view of metacognition should be based on the same two-factor model that 
has been used in previous literature. Educational implications of this study are 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Metacognition is a fuzzy concept but 
widely utilized by the research 
community in multiple fields, including 
psychology, education, learning sciences, 
neuroscience, and clinical psychology. 
Metacognition is often defined by its’ 
accompanying skills—monitoring, 
evaluating, strategy use--or defined as an 
umbrella term, for instance “thinking 
about thinking.”  Further, Flavell (1976) 
put forward that metacognition as “one’s 
knowledge concerning one’s own 
cognitive processes and products” (p. 
232). Researchers from multiple fields 
take aspects of metacognition and apply 
them to their particular fields. However, it 
is still unclear if there is an umbrella 
concept with one major factor that can be 
labeled metacognition or whether 
metacognition has clear and distinct 
factors upon which researchers can base 
their future research. Expressing the same 
concept using multiple terms (e.g., 
executive skills, metacognitive beliefs, 
and judgments of learning (Veenman, 
Van Hout-Wolters & Afflerbach, 2006) 
can confuse the construct keeping it 
consistently fuzzy and vague.  Research 
has shown that metacognitive skills are 
indeed connected to positive academic 
outcomes (e.g., Everson & Tobias, 1998; 
Isaacson et al., 2006; Tobias, Everson & 
Laitusis, 1999). Thus, providing a clearer 
picture of the nature of metacognition will 
help grow the existing knowledge base 
surrounding the educational implications 
of this concept. The current study seeks to 
determine whether metacognition is a 
single construct or made up of multiple 
factors that can easily be differentiated 
and applied to students’ educational 
experience. 
According to Flavell (1979), 
metacognition can be broken down into 
four categories: 1) metacognitive 
knowledge, 2) metacognitive experiences, 
3) goals (or tasks), and 4) actions (or 
strategies).  Metacognitive knowledge is 
conceptualized as the knowledge that has 
been accumulated over time about 
humans as cognitive beings and that 
humans have goals, experiences, take 
action, and perform tasks.  The concept of 
metacognitive knowledge can be further 
broken down into three specific classes: 
person, task, and strategy. First, the 
person class is everything that one knows 
about oneself as a cognitive processor and 
the knowledge that other people are also 
cognitive in nature. Second, the task-
oriented class incorporates the knowledge 
of how the nature of the information one 
encounters affects and constrains how 
one should deal with it (Flavell, 1979).  
Lastly, the strategy class is the knowledge 
of which strategies are appropriate to use 
in any specific situation.  Flavell (1979) 
went on to explain that these three levels 
of metacognitive knowledge always 
interact with one another. That is, one’s 
knowledge about people as cognitive 
beings influences one’s understanding of 
the nature of information within tasks and 
how to handle that information with the 
appropriate strategies. Additionally, 
Flavell made explicit that metacognitive 
knowledge is “not fundamentally different 
from other knowledge stored in long-term 
memory” (Flavell, 1979, p. 907). That is, 
metacognitive knowledge is not removed 
from the general information processing 
model and the knowledge one has about 
one’s own thinking is stored just as any 
other type of knowledge. 
Metacognitive experiences are 
conceptualized as any conscious 
experience (cognitive or emotional) that 
accompanies any intellectual activity.  
Flavell (1979) explains that: 
"First, they can lead you to establish new 
goals and to revise or abandon old ones. 
Experiences of puzzlement or failure can 
have any of these effects, for example.  
Second, metacognitive experiences can 
affect your metacognitive knowledge 
base by adding to it, deleting from it, or 
  | 2013 | vol. 2 | Nº2  
  University of Alicante 
  
[122]     
revising it…Finally, metacognitive 
experiences can activate strategies aimed 
at either of two types of goals-cognitive 
or metacognitive." (p. 908). 
These experiences lead people to stronger 
metacognitive abilities across all 
categories, including goals and actions. 
Goals (or tasks) refer to the objectives of 
a cognitive activity and action (or 
strategies) refers to the cognitions or other 
behaviors employed to meet those goals. 
Therefore, each time one has a 
metacognitive experience their 
metacognitive knowledge, goals and 
actions are affected. This reasoning 
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, 
to study each aspect of metacognition 
individually without accounting for the 
others. If one were to create a model of 
the multiple aspects of metacognition, she 
would need to allow for all the variables 
to be correlated with one another. One of 
the reasons that this categorization of 
metacognition is important is because it 
influenced researchers for decades and 
lead to an interest in dissecting the 
concept of metacognition and many 
valiant attempts in the literature to make 
the term less all-encompassing and 
“fuzzy.”  By categorizing metacognition 
into subcomponents, Flavell also opened 
the door to the training of specific 
metacognitive aspects in the classroom. 
In order to help clarify the concept of 
metacognition, multiple other definitions 
have been offered. For example, Schraw 
(2001) defined metacognition as 
knowledge and regulation of cognition.  
Knowledge of cognition is further defined 
as awareness and what students know 
about their own cognition or about 
cognition in general.  Regulation of 
cognition is defined as a set of activities 
that help students control their learning, 
attentional resources, use of strategies, 
awareness of comprehension breakdowns, 
planning, monitoring, and evaluating their 
own thinking.  Schraw’s approach differs 
from that of Flavell for several reasons but 
most importantly he focused on the 
educational implications of metacognition 
and on simplifying the categorization of 
metacognition to two levels.  Granted, 
each level does incorporate a breadth of 
processes, but Schraw focused his 
attention on just two categories. As a 
means of better understanding the 
difference between cognition and 
metacognition, Schraw (1998) agreed 
with Gamer’s (1987) position that 1) 
cognitive skills are necessary to perform a 
task, and 2) metacognition is necessary to 
understand how the task was performed. 
Another definition of metacognition was 
offered by Alexander, Carr and 
Schwanenflugel (1995) who subdivided 
metacognition into three parts: 1) 
declarative metacognitive knowledge, 2) 
cognitive monitoring and 3) regulation of 
strategies. Although this definition is 
similar to Flavell’s, the focus has been 
placed directly on knowledge, monitoring 
and regulation of cognition. In fact, 
Flavell’s concepts of the three aspects of 
metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
experiences, and goals, all very broad 
categories, are not found in Alexander et 
al.’s definition. By extracting these 
concepts, Alexander et al. (1995) have 
been able to specify more exact processes 
that account for overall metacognition. 
Although more subcomponents of 
metacognition have been accepted by the 
field (e.g., attention (Miller & Jordan, 
1982), procedural metacognitive 
knowledge (Schraw, 2001), planning 
(Zimmerman, 1989), knowledge of 
cognition and regulation/monitoring of 
that knowledge seem to be the two main 
components that have been studied 
thoroughly. 
We believe that incorporating all 
respected components of metacognition 
into a single definition would be 
beneficial to the research community as a 
whole. One of the most influential 
problems in metacognitive research is the 
lack of clarity in the definition of 
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metacognition and its components 
(White, 1988). Although most research 
on metacognition breaks the construct 
down into two components: knowledge 
of cognition and regulation of cognition 
(e.g., Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1979; Schraw 
& Moshman, 1995), these two categories 
further consist of several subcomponents. 
It involves knowledge of one’s own and 
others’ cognitive processes; planning 
prior to performing a task; monitoring 
one’s own thinking, learning and 
understanding while performing a task; 
regulating one’s thinking by making the 
proper adjustments; controlling thinking 
to optimize performance; and evaluating 
cognitive processes after a solution has 
been found. Table 1 summarizes the 
definitions of each of the aspects of the 
working definition of metacognition. A 
related aspect of metacognition, 
metacognitive accuracy, is one’s ability to 
accurately predict his outcome on a 
particular task.  
 
Component Working Definition When Used in Learning 
Process 
Knowledge What individuals know 
about their own cognition 
and cognition in general. 
  
Before, During, After 
Planning Recognizing the existence of 
a problem, defining the 
nature of the problem, and 
deciding on a strategy for 
solving the problema. 
 
Before 
Monitoring The assessment of the 
progress of one’s current 
thinking and work on a 
particular task. 
 
During 
Regulation/Control The conscious and non-
conscious decisions that one 
makes based on the output of 
one’s monitoring processes. 
 
During 
Evaluation The process of appraising 
one’s work that has since 
been completed  
 
After 
Table 1. Metacognitive Terminology. 
 
However, it is still unclear whether these 
are all separate components or if items 
representing them may fall under the 
auspices of two larger components of 
metacognition - knowledge and 
regulation. Regardless of the number of 
components, most researchers have taken 
a componential view of metacognition, 
rather than a uni-dimensional view. 
Furthermore, most have focused on only 
one component of metacognition at a time 
in their studies. Research on 
metacognition has mainly focused on 
metacognitive knowledge or regulation. 
Flavell (1979) put forward that the types 
of metacognitive knowledge in his 
definition could not stand alone; there is a 
constant interplay among them. We 
believe this concept is true for all 
components of metacognition. That is, the 
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components of metacognition (e.g., 
metacognitive knowledge, metacognition 
regulation) should not be examined alone 
due to the interactions among them. The 
factor structure of metacognition is 
unclear due to the contradictions in the 
literature (e.g. Flavell, 1979; Schraw, 
2001; Alexander, Carr & 
Schwanenflugel, 1995). However, it is 
expected that after performing an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and a 
follow-up confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA), either two or five factors will have 
the best fit with the data. 
 
2. Material and Methods 
2.1.  Participants 
Participants totaled 644 undergraduate 
students from a large Midwestern 
university. Students participated within 
their regular final exam time in five 
subject areas: chemistry (1 class), 
biology (2 classes), astronomy (1 class), 
history (2 classes) and education (2 
classes). The average self-reported high 
school GPA for the sample was 3.59, 
and the sample consisted of 53.6% 
female and 46.4% male students. 
 
2.2. Metacognition Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was designed for this 
study to measure five components of 
metacognition, which are prevalent in 
the literature but rarely studied 
concurrently (i.e., knowledge, planning, 
monitoring, regulation/control, and 
evaluation).  Although there are many 
options for measuring metacognition 
(e.g., think aloud protocols, one on one 
interviews, online measurement, etc.), a 
questionnaire was most relevant for this 
particular study given the need to 
perform a factor analysis to determine 
the factor structure of metacognition as 
a construct. The survey was created 
using a state-trait model, and items were 
written from a state metacognitive 
standpoint. The questionnaire consisted 
of 30 total items, with roughly six items 
per construct. Future research can take 
the results from this study as a baseline 
for the componential view of 
metacognition and utilize various 
methods for replication and validation. 
The questionnaire used in the current 
study was a compilation of three 
existing sources: 
1) Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
(MAI). Schraw and Dennison (1994) set 
out to create a questionnaire that 
confirmed the theoretical existence of 
eight subcomponents of metacognition: 
1) declarative knowledge, 2) procedural 
knowledge, 3) conditional knowledge, 
4) planning, 5) information 
management strategies, 6) monitoring, 
7) debugging strategies, and 8) 
evaluation of learning. However, the 
final factor structure was best 
represented by two factors: knowledge 
of cognition and regulation of cognition, 
accounting for 65% of the sample 
variance.  The resulting questionnaire 
consisted of 52-items on a Likert scale. 
The internal consistency for the 
Knowledge of Cognition scale was .93 
and for the Regulation of Cognition 
scale was .88. In two experiments, 
Schraw et al. (1994) found a significant 
relationship between knowledge and 
regulation of cognition (r=.54 and .45, 
respectively). 
2) Inventory of Metacognitive Self 
Regulation (IMSR). Howard, McGee, 
Shia and Hong (2000) developed the 
IMSR from two existing measures: 1) 
the junior MAI (Sperling, Howard, & 
Murphy, 2002), and the 2) How I Solve 
Problems survey (Fortunato, Hecht, 
Tittle, & Alvarez, 1991). An 
exploratory factor analysis was run and 
produced a five factor solution, 
accounting for 56.3% of the sample 
variance.  The resulting measure (after 
removing items that did not load well 
on any factor) consisted of 23 items 
measured on a Likert scale.  Because 
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Howard et al. (2000) were interested in 
creating a new measure specific to 
metacognition in the context of 
problem-solving, they examined the 
remaining 23 items and revised or 
rewrote them to increase reliability, and 
wrote additional items to clearly 
demonstrate the existence of the five 
factors found in the initial analysis. The 
final version of the measure consisted of 
37 items with a five point Likert scale. 
In a second study, Howard et al. (2000) 
conducted another exploratory factor 
analysis with the new measure again 
revealing a five factor structure with 
eigenvalues over 1.12, accounting for 
51.6% of the variance. The overall 
reliability for the measure was 
alpha=.935, and the reliability for each 
factor ranged from alpha=.720 to .867.  
The five factors were labeled as: 1) 
knowledge of cognition, 2) objectivity, 
3) problem representation, 4) subtask 
monitoring, and 5) evaluation.  . 
3) O’Neil’s Self-Assessment 
Questionnaire (SAQ). The SAQ was 
created to measure four components of 
metacognition (planning, monitoring, 
cognitive strategies, and awareness). The 
measure was based on a state-trait model 
for metacognition, and the SAQ was 
written as a state metacognitive 
measure. That is, the items were written 
to elicit responses from students about a 
particular test they had just taken. This 
is in stark contrast to the first two 
measures (MAI and IMSR), which were 
designed for responses for general 
metacognitive thinking. For 12th 
graders, the reliability for each 
component subscale (consisting of five 
items) ranged from .73 to .78. A factor 
analysis confirmed only one factor per 
subscale (O’Neil & Abedi, 1996). The 
overall reliability of the measure was 
not provided. 
Each of these existing measures offered 
items that matched with a variety of 
metacognitive components.  However, 
none of the existing measures 
encompassed all of the components that 
have been theoretically derived and 
reported consistently in the literature 
(knowledge, attention, monitoring, etc.). 
Therefore, items were extracted from 
each of the three existing measures to 
create a more complete measure that 
theoretically contains the five 
aforementioned components (see Table 
1).  Items from the MAI and IMSR 
were modified where students would 
respond about a specific task they had 
just performed (state-based), rather than 
general statements.  Items were chosen 
for their relevance to five-theoretical 
components of metacognition: 1) 
metacognitive knowledge, 2) 
monitoring, 3) planning, 4) evaluation, 
and 5) regulation/control. The resulting 
questionnaire consisted of 30 items 
based on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
Students in each class were introduced 
to the study by their instructor via email 
or in class 2-3 weeks prior to data 
collection. Data collection occurred 
during the students’ regularly scheduled 
final exam period. Before they began 
their exam, all students were told that 
there was a consent form to be signed 
and questionnaire to be completed. It 
was also made clear that participation 
was voluntary and they had the option 
to complete the questionnaire after they 
finished their exam. An incentive was 
offered to the students who participated; 
one person who completed the survey 
from each class would be randomly 
chosen to win a monetary prize of $50. 
After finishing their final exam, 
students completed the informed 
consent form and filled out the 
questionnaire. The survey included 
metacognitive items related to the final 
exam, and this process took 
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approximately 5-10 minutes.  Any 
questions that the students had about the 
survey were addressed by raising their 
hands and the researcher helped them 
individually with comprehension issues. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Characteristics of Questionnaire 
Items 
After an examination of the Q-Q plots 
for each of the 30 items on the 
questionnaire, all items appeared to 
follow a normal distribution.   There 
were no outliers for any of the items 
because the responses were restricted 
from 1 to 5 (Likert-type scale).   
However, item 28 from the original 
questionnaire was removed due to the 
fact that it asked students if they asked 
for help when they did not understand 
something on their final exam. This 
could have been interpreted as asking a 
student next to them, which would be 
considered cheating by instructors. 
Thus, the following analyses were 
performed with 29 items. 
Missing Data. On each of the 29 items, 
there were between zero and six missing 
data points. No pattern could be 
discerned; thus it was determined that 
the data were missing at random. 
Because dropping all participants with 
any missing data would have decreased 
the sample size by 36, a multiple 
imputation procedure, through the 
LISREL 8.0, was carried out on all 29 
items. Multiple imputation is a preferred 
method for dealing with missing data 
even if the data is not missing at random 
or completely at random (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). 
 
3.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
An exploratory factor analysis was 
performed on the survey data using SPSS 
15.0; there were 640 participants with 
complete data for the analysis. Principal 
axis factoring was used to reveal the 
underlying structure of the data.  Oblique 
rotation (promax method) was used to 
rotate the data due to previous research 
findings indicating that metacognitive 
components are typically moderately to 
strongly correlated with each other.  
Variable communalities were examined 
to determine the variability that the 
individual items were accounting for in 
the factors. Three communalities were 
low (below .30), suggesting that those 
items did not explain much variance 
within the factors.  However, these items 
were not removed from the analysis 
without examining the factor structure 
and factor loadings. Utilizing the 29 
items, the index of goodness of fit 
(Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test) was calculated, 
yielding a coefficient of .92.  This 
established the data as suitable for factor 
analysis according to the .80 criterion put 
forth by Hair, Anderson, Tatham and 
Black (1998). 
Three methods were used to determine 
the factor structure of the data.  First, all 
factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 were 
extracted. Second, the interpretability of 
the factors was assessed. Lastly, the scree 
test (Cattell, 1966) was used to finalize 
the suitability of the factor structure. 
Using the first criteria, five components 
with eigenvalues over 1.0 were extracted, 
accounting for 52.6% of the variance.  
Inspection of the five components, 
however, revealed that the last three 
components were not easily interpretable. 
The items that were originally included to 
load on each of the five factors did not do 
so with any consistency. Thus, a two-
factor model, as cited in the literature 
(e.g., Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1979; Schraw 
& Moshman, 1995), was tested by only 
extracting two factors in the subsequent 
analysis. 
The two-factor model was most 
appropriate and interpretable, and the 
scree test confirmed this conclusion, 
which indeed suggested a two-factor 
model. The examination of the items 
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loading on each of the factors did lend 
themselves to the constructs of 
metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive regulation; these two 
subcomponents of overall metacognition 
are well documented in the literature.  
The two-factor model accounted for 
40.2% of the variance, with eigenvalues 
of 8.58 and 3.09 for the two factors, 
respectively. Comrey and Lee (1992) 
established that factor coefficients of .71 
were excellent, .63 were very good, .55 
were good, .45 were fair, and .32 were 
poor. Thus, a conservative threshold was 
decided to be between “good” and “fair” 
for this particular analysis, set at .50.  
Examination of the pattern matrix 
revealed that eight items had factor 
coefficients below .50.  These items were 
removed from the subsequent 
confirmatory factor analysis model and 
the future use of the factors as outcome 
measures in multiple regressions.  
 
3.3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Two confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) 
based on the previous exploratory factor 
analysis and the theoretical five-factor 
model were performed through LISREL 
8.0. Although the five-factor model did 
not emerge from the EFA, it was still 
important to examine the differences 
between the models to assess the best 
fitting model. 
The five-factor model based on the 
original theoretical conception (utilizing 
all 29 items) was estimated using the 
default of maximum likelihood.  All 
factors were hypothesized to be 
moderately correlated.  The results for the 
adequacy of the five-factor model were 
mixed.  First, the chi-square results were 
significant, which indicates a poor fit of 
the model, χ2 (367, N=640)=1790.64, 
p<.01. Second, the goodness of fit of the 
model was tested through the ratio of χ2 
to degrees of freedom, which was 4.88. 
Ideally, the ratio should be 3.0 or below, 
thus suggesting a moderately poor fit, 
though this threshold is debated in the 
literature (Delandshere, 4/3/08, personal 
communication). Last, the indices of 
goodness of fit revealed a relatively good 
fit, with the non-normed fit index 
(NNFI)=.93, the comparative fit index 
(CFI)=.93, and the root mean square error 
approximation (RMSEA)=.08. These 
three indices of goodness of fit are a 
subset of a great many indices but are the 
recommended indices in the current 
literature (e.g., Schrieber, Stage, King, 
Nora & Barlow, 2006). Thus, the final 
interpretation of the fit of the model was a 
low to moderate fit with the data. 
Post-hoc model modifications were 
performed to find a better fitting model. 
The analysis suggested that two items’ 
error variance should be correlated. After 
examining the two items, it was found 
that the items were more similar to each 
other than similar to the other items in the 
factor. This provided the necessary 
evidence to follow the suggestions put 
forth as modification indices and correlate 
the error variance between items 11 and 
12.  The resulting model was a better fit 
than the original.  Again, the chi-square 
results were significant, χ2 (366, 
N=640)=1594.44, p<.01.  However, the 
ratio of χ2 to degrees of freedom was 
better than the original model, 4.35. The 
fit indices remained fairly stable with the 
NNFI=.93, CFI=.94, and the 
RMSEA=.08.  Also, the original model 
had a model AIC of 2146.00 and the 
modified model had a model AIC of 
1955.37, a difference of 190.37.  
Schreiber et al. (2006) suggest that the 
model AIC can be a comparison between 
models, with lower scores indicating a 
better fit. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the modified five-factor model is a better 
fit than the original five-factor model. 
A two-factor confirmatory factor analysis 
was conducted to assess whether the five-
factor or two-factor model was a better fit 
to the data.  The two-factor model was 
based on the results from the exploratory 
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factor analysis, utilizing the final 21 
items. As with the EFA, the two latent 
factors were hypothesized to be 
moderately correlated. The default of 
maximum likelihood estimation was used 
to estimate the model. The results for the 
adequacy of the model were mixed. First, 
the chi-square result was significant, 
which indicates a poor fit of the model, χ2 
(188, N=640) =939.72, p<.01.  Second, 
the goodness of fit of the model was 
tested through the ratio of χ2 to the 
degrees of freedom, which was 5.00. 
Last, the indices of goodness of fit 
revealed a relatively good fit, with the 
NNFI=.92, the CFI=.93 and the 
RMSEA=.08.  Thus, the final 
interpretation of the fit of the model, like 
the original five-factor model, was a low 
to moderate fit with the data. 
Post hoc model modifications were 
performed to develop a better fitting 
model. Based on the modification indices, 
it was again suggested that items 11 and 
12’s error variance be correlated to 
improve the fit of the model.  After 
examining the two items, it was found 
that the items were more similar to each 
other than similar to the other items in the 
factor. This provided the necessary 
evidence to follow the suggestions put 
forth as modification indices and correlate 
the error variance between items 11 and 
12. The chi-square for the new model was 
again significant, χ2 (187, N=640) 
=714.13, p<.01. However, the fit indices 
after this modification revealed a better 
fit, with the NNFI=.95, CFI=.95, and 
RMSEA=.07.  The change in χ2 between 
the two models was significant, χ2change 
(1, N=640) =225.59, p<.01.  Also, the 
original model had a model AIC of 
1025.72 and the modified model had a 
model AIC of 802.13, a difference of 
223.59.  Thus, it can be inferred from 
these results that the second model is 
stronger than the original. Table 2 
presents the results from the five-factor 
models and the two-factor models. 
 
Model df χ2 χ2 /df RMSEA NNFI CFI AIC 
Original 5-
factor 
367 1790.64 4.88 .08 .93 .94 2146.00 
Original 2-
factor 
188 939.72 5.00 .08 .92 .93 1025.72 
Modified 
5-factor 
366 1594.44 4.35 .08 .93 .94 1955.37 
Modified 
2-factor 
187 714.13 3.82 .07 .95 .95 802.13 
Table 2. Fit Statistics for Maximum-Likelihood Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 
Although the modified two-factor 
model had slightly better degrees of 
freedom to chi-square ratio and slightly 
better fit indices than the modified five-
factor model, both models are fairly 
similar. However, most literature has 
shown a two-factor model of 
metacognition, the exploratory factor 
analysis revealed two factors, and the 
two-factor model is clearly more 
parsimonious. Also, when the 
exploratory factor analysis was forced 
into a five-factor structure, the last three 
factors did not make conceptual sense 
and very few, if any, items loaded at an 
acceptable level. Therefore, the 
modified two-factor model was 
accepted. 
Each of the two factors in the two factor 
model had moderately strong internal 
consistency as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha. The reliabilities for each 
component of metacognition are 
presented in Table 3. 
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Metacognitive Factor     Cronbach’s alpha (reliability) 
 
Metacognitive Knowledge                                       =.85 
 
Metacognitive Regulation                                       =.87 
Table 3. Reliabilities of Metacognitive Knowledge and Metacognitive Regulation Factors. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
4.1.  Discussion 
The literature is mixed when it comes to 
the definition and components of 
metacognition. Most research 
acknowledges two main components: 
knowledge and regulation (e.g., Schraw, 
2001), but it remained unclear whether 
this two-component model was driven by 
questionnaires and methods that really 
were only addressing those two 
components. Thus, we created a survey 
that incorporated these and other 
theoretically derived and consistently 
cited subcomponents of metacognition 
(planning, evaluation, and monitoring) to 
determine whether the two-component 
model stands or the five components 
emerge as independent factors. The 
results suggest that a two-factor model 
does hold up when these other 
subcomponents are introduced in the data. 
The exploratory factor analysis produced 
a convincing structure with items loading 
on two factors that resembled 
metacognitive knowledge and regulation. 
Items from the planning and evaluation 
subcomponents were split with some 
loading on knowledge and some on 
regulation. The monitoring items all 
loaded strongly on the regulation factor. 
Regardless of the split of the items, the 
two-factor model outperformed the five-
factor model in terms of the Scree Plot 
and interpretability of factors in the EFA 
and in terms of fit indices from the CFA 
(See Table 2). The componential view of 
metacognition should be based on the 
two-factor model resultant here and in 
much of the previous literature. 
 
4.2. Conclusions 
The main limitation for this study is the 
use of a self-report questionnaire to 
measure metacognition. Multiple 
methods can be used to assess 
metacognition, such as think aloud 
protocols (e.g., Rosenzweig, Krawec & 
Montague, 2011), verbal interviews (e.g., 
Winne, 2010), and computer logs (e.g., 
Veenman & Spaans, 2005), among 
others. However, each type of 
measurement device for metacognition, 
or any internal construct has both pros 
and cons. By combining three existing 
questionnaires to create one 
comprehensive version, we are remaining 
consistent with much of the literature and 
providing a useful tool for easily 
measuring the two factors of 
metacognition. The educational 
implications from this study are clear. 
Providing clarity in the definition and 
measurement of metacognition, 
educational psychologists and educators 
can continue their work in understanding 
the relationship between metacognition 
and academic achievement. Establishing 
reliable and clear tools to measure 
students’ metacognitive knowledge and 
regulation can assist everyday educators 
in their quest of improving higher order 
thinking skills that are lacking in today’s 
classrooms.  
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